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The present report aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the pandemic situation of COVID-19 in the 
EU countries, and to be able to foresee the situation in the next coming days. We provide some figures and 
tables with several indexes and indicators as well as an Analysis section that discusses a specific topic related 
with the pandemic. 
As for the predictions, we employ an empirical model, verified with the evolution of the number of confirmed 
cases in previous countries where the epidemic is close to conclude, including all provinces of China. The 
model does not pretend to interpret the causes of the evolution of the cases but to permit the evaluation of 
the quality of control measures made in each state and a short-term prediction of trends. Note, however, 
that the effects of the measures’ control that start on a given day are not observed until approximately 7-14 
days later. 
We show an individual report with 8 graphs and a summary table with the main indicators for different 
countries and regions. We are adjusting the model to countries and regions with at least 4 days with more 
than 100 confirmed cases and a current load over 200 cases. 
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Situation and highlights 
Global situation 
Growth in most countries is becoming 
increasingly evident. However, there are 
some countries where this growth may 
seem less worrying. We will compare 
France, Spain and the UK with Germany 
and Italy, in order to try inferring the 
evolution of the least growing countries 
(Germany and Italy). In the following 
figures, we represent the daily new cases 
and the empirical reproduction number 
(ρ7), all of them calculated with the 7-day 
moving average of new cases. It is very 
worrying to note that, since July, the ρ7 
in all countries is almost always higher 
than 1, so the growth is constant. If we 
average ρ7 from July 1 to October 4 we find: France 1.17; Spain 1.20; UK 1.25; Germany 1.08; Italy 1.13. 
Indeed, the average rate of spread of the pandemic has been higher in the UK, Spain and France than in 
Germany and Italy. However, these two countries are also showing a growing trend. They are in the situation 
of Spain at the end of July. Its growth may be slower, but if the value of the reproductive number is not 
reduced, its trajectory will be similar to that of the other three countries. On the other hand, the gradual 







• Highest 14-day cumulative incidence corresponds to Czech Republic (344), which overcomes Spain 
(304). 
• The list of countries with an EPG>100 increases from 15 to 17. Denmark leaves the list, but Portugal, 
Lichtenstein and Malta are added to it. 
• United Kingdom reports such an incrase in new cases that ρ7 increases up to 1.8. It is currently the 
third country at highest risk after Czech Republic (467) and the Netherlands (350). Spain and France 
show a slight decrease on the risk index and situate at the level of 277 and 256, respectively. 
• Only Denmark shows a ρ7 clearly below 1 (0.8). 
 
Situation and trends per country 
Maps of current situation in EU countries. Colour scale is indicated in each legend. 
• Cumulative incidence: total number of reported cases per 100,000 inhabitants 
• A14: Cumulative incidence last 14 days per 100,000 inhabitants (active cases) 
• ρ7: Empiric reproduction number  
• EPG: Effective Potential Growth (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝐴𝐴14 · 𝜌𝜌7) 
 



















(1) ρ7 is the average of 7 consecutive ρ, but can still fluctuate. (2) EPG stands for Effective Growth Potential, which is the 
product of reported cumulative incidence of last 14 days per 105 inhabitants by ρ7 (empiric reproduction number). 








Situation of hospitalisations and ICUs in some EU countries. The analysis is done for those countries that 
report a historical series with current (active) number of patients in hospitals and ICUs1. We provide: 
• Current active hospitalisations and patients in ICU per 100,000 inhabitants. 
• Current absolute number of active hospitalisations and patients in ICU. 
• Rate of occupation of curative care hospital beds by Covid-19 patients (data from Eurostat 20182), 
only for hospitalisations. 
• Current rate of occupation with regards to the maximum Covid-19 occupation reached in this 
pandemic. 
• Weekly increase in Covid-19 patients in hospitals and ICUs. 
 






Situation and trends in some European regions3 
Table of current situation in Spain regions. Colour scale is indicated in each legend.  
 
Maps of current situation in Spanish regions. Colour scale is indicated in each legend. 











Table of current situation in UK regions. Colour scale is indicated in each legend.  
 
 


















(1) ρ7 is the average of 7 consecutive ρ, but can still fluctuate. (2) EPG stands for Effective Growth Potential, which is the 
product of reported cumulative incidence of last 14 days per 105 inhabitants by ρ7 (empiric reproduction number). 






Analysis: Spanish second wave (V). Assessment on the level of epidemiological 
surveillance in July. Budget and personnel (part II). 
In different assessments during the last weeks, dealing with the analysis of the second wave of covid19 
infection in Spain, we wondered about the different hypothesis that can explain Spain as the leading country 
in new infections. In last report4, we started analyzing one of them, related with the health budget and 
personnel. We discussed the necessary mobility of resources, which is not always possible, and quantified 
the personnel needed for an efficient contact tracing. In the case of Spain, we quantified these personnel at 
around 10,000 specialized nurses and supporting technicians. In the case of Catalunya and Aragón, they 
would need around 1,000-1,500 nurses each. Finally, we also showed that Spain expenditure is roughly at 
level for European Union, although lower than that of countries like France or the Netherlands.  We showed 
that the percentage of the budget devoted to public health is very small in all European countries.  
Therefore, the key question is not the budget per se, but the ability and feasibility to direct personnel and 
budget from other parts of the budget to fight this pandemic. Today, we focus on one of the key stones of 
epidemiological surveillance: nursing personnel.      
Spain did not have the resources needed to deploy epidemiological surveillance in the question that matters 
more: nursing personnel. In other words, the lack of any spare personnel in nursery lead to a complete lack 
of personnel in doing interviews and contact tracing. 
We have three important sources of proof for that: 
• First, our interviews with epidemiologists in the field always indicated that they had the proper 
number of doctor and epidemiologists to analyze the situation but that public health had basically 
not enough nursery personnel. Even dedicating all nurses to those units it was not enough given the 
low level of resources.  
• Second, public health officials have indicated that primary care centers had to be the first line of 
defense to fight Covid-19 instead of but in coordination with territorial epidemiological units. In 
particular, they must carry out the diagnostic and the contact tracing study, while several external 
agents are responsible to carry out the calls. It is logical, only primary care have nursery personnel 
large enough to try to redirect the 10,000 people needed for the contact tracing in Spain. In Catalonia 
and Aragón, the needs were around 1,000 or, given the level of outbreak, 2,000. The only place to 
find such a number of nurses was in primary care facilities. 
• Third, the numbers of nursery personnel in primary health centers in Spain are not even on the 
average of Europe. They are basically the bottom of it. The lack in nursery personnel in Spain and 
most of the regions is simply astounding. We found the key graph in the report State of Health in 
Spain for the UE5. 
 
 
                                                          
4 https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/329875  





Figure 1: Active nursery personnel (y-axis) vs medical doctors in different European countries. Four quartiles are shown: 
bottom-left, few doctors-few nurses; bottom-right, many doctors-few nurses; up-left, few doctors-many nurses; up-
right, many doctors-many nurses6. Blue lines indicate European mean values. 
 
Only Bulgaria and Latvia have clearly lower number of nursery personnel than Spain. Spain is at the bottom 
together with Poland, Italy and Slovakia. Among the countries that we are comparing Spain with in the second 
wave, like France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Czech Republic or Romania, all of them have more nursery 
personnel. In fact, France and the Netherlands almost double its numbers 
Spain has roughly 280,000 nursery personnel, half of them attached to public hospitals. Another huge fraction 
is private personnel, since a wide part of the health care budget is private and cannot be deployed for contact 
tracing. So, the key data is how much nurses are working in primary care both in Spain and in the regions 
where the first outbreak appeared. We show these numbers in the following table7. As we can see, the total 
number of nursery personnel working in primary care (second column) is 30,000. Recall that the total number 
of contact tracers needed in Spain is roughly 10,000. In other words, proper contact tracing would require 
re-training or redirecting 1/3 of the workforce. Performing Covid-19 duties plus normal care is absolutely 
impossible without complete exhaustion of personnel working more than 10 hours per day non-stop. This is 
plainly impossible. In Catalonia and Aragon, for example, 6,000 nurses were in primary care, and 1,500 were 







                                                          





Table 1: Distribution of nursery personnel (total, first column) among primary care (second column), hospitals (third), 
urgencies and emergencies (fourth) and specialized formation (fifth). Last column indicates the ratio of nurses per 1,000 
inhabitants. Data by Spanish autonomous community.  
 
We reach a very clear conclusion. Without hiring more personnel in primary care and public health units 
specialized in making interviews, tracing contacts, and deciding who requires a PCR test (being 
asymptomatic), tracing an important outbreak in Spain was plainly impossible 
It is thus not strange to observe that the cornerstone of the plan to control Covid-19 in Catalunya has been 
to deploy 1,000 Covid agents in primary care plus another 1,000 people in other positions (call centers) to 
reduce the work load from nurses and medical doctors. This deployment was carried out during the month 
of August. Compared with Madrid, who did not deploy these numbers, the different evolution of both regions 
is astounding. However, we must resist direct comparison since measures for reducing were also applied in 
Catalunya. With the present level of incidence in Catalunya (weekly incidence of 100 cases per 100,000 
inhabitants), the amount of people and PCR to control it is huge. Therefore, this incidence is almost 
impossible to manage without measures that reduce the number of effective contacts to track. In this line of 
thought, one of the key measures in Catalunya has been to forbid any gathering of more than six people, 
trying to focus on less than 10 people per infected person. So far, the measures and deployment have been 









Legend: Countries’ reports details 
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(2) Analysis and prediction of COVID-19 




































































(1) Data source 
Data are daily obtained from European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)8 and country official 
sources (when indicated). Daily data comprise, among others: total confirmed cases, total confirmed new 
cases, total deaths, total new deaths. It must be considered that the report is always providing data from 
previous day. In the document we use the date at which the datapoint is assumed to belong, i.e., report from 
15/03/2020 is giving data from 14/03/2020, the latter being used in the subsequent analysis.  
(2) Data processing and plotting 
Data are initially processed with Matlab in order to update timeseries, i.e., last datapoints are added to 
historical sequences. These timeseries are plotted for individual countries and for the UE+EFTA+UK as a 
whole: 
 Number of cumulative confirmed cases 
 Number of reported new cases 
 Number of cumulative deaths  
Then, two indicators are calculated and plotted, too: 
 Case fatality rate: number of cumulative deaths divided by the number of cumulative confirmed 
cases, and reported as a percentage; it is an indirect indicator of the diagnostic level. 
 ρ: this variable is related with the reproduction number, i.e., with the number of new infections 
caused by a single case. It is evaluated as follows for the day before last report (t-1): 
𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡 − 1) =
𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 1) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 2)
𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 5) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 6) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 7)
 
where Nnew(t) is the number of new confirmed cases at day t after applying a 7-day moving average 
to the new cases dataset, so that fluctuations (e.g., weekend effect) are smoothed.  
(3) Classification of countries according to their epidemic level: the scale Biocom-Cov 
Countries are assigned a degree in the discrete Biocom-Cov scale, which aims to facilitate a simple way of 
assessing the situation of the country. It is based on the level of daily new cases per 100,000 inhabitants as 
follows: 
Pandemic degree Daily new incident 

















(4) Fitting a mathematical model to data 
Previous studies have shown that Gompertz model9 correctly describes the Covid-19 epidemic in all analysed 
countries. It is an empirical model that starts with an exponential growth but that gradually decreases its 
specific growth rate. Therefore, it is adequate for describing an epidemic wave that is characterized by an 
initial exponential growth but a progressive decrease in spreading velocity provided that appropriate control 
measures are applied. Once in the tail, predictions work but the meaning of parameters is lost. 
Gompertz model is described by the equation:  





where N(t) is the cumulated number of confirmed cases at t (in days), and N0 is the number of cumulated 
cases the day at day t0. The model has two parameters: 
 a is the velocity at which specific spreading rate is slowing down; 
 K is the expected final number of cumulated cases at the end of the epidemic. 
This model is fitted to reported cumulative cases of the UE and of countries that accomplish two criteria: 4 
or more consecutive days with more than 100 cumulated cases, and at least one datapoint over 200 cases. 
Day t0 is chosen as that one at which N(t) overpasses 100 cases. If more than 15 datapoints that accomplish 
the stated criteria are available, only the last 15 points are used. The fitting is done using Matlab’s Curve 
Fitting package with Nonlinear Least Squares method, which also provides confidence intervals of fitted 
parameters (a and K) and the R2 of the fitting. At the initial stages the dynamics is exponential and K cannot 
be correctly evaluated. In fact, at this stage the most relevant parameter is a.  
It is worth to mention that the simplicity of this model and the lack of previous assumptions about the Covid-
19 behaviour make it appropriate for universal use, i.e., it can be fitted to any country independently of its 
socioeconomic context and control strategy. Then, the model is capable of quantifying the observed 
dynamics in an objective and standard manner and predicting short-term tendencies.  
(5) Using the model for predicting short-term tendencies 
The model is finally used for a short-term prediction of the evolution of the cumulated number of cases (3-5 
days). The confidence interval of predictions is assessed with the Matlab function predint, with a 99% 
confidence level. These predictions are shown in the plots as red dots with corresponding error bar. For series 
longer than 9 timepoints, last 3 points are weighted in the fitting so that changes in tendencies are well 
captured by the model. 
(6) Estimating non-diagnosed cases 
Lethality of Covid-19 has been estimated at around 1 % for Republic of Korea and the Diamond Princess 
cruise. Besides, median duration of viral shedding after Covid-19 onset has been estimated at 18.5 days for 
non-survivors10 in a retrospective study in Wuhan. These data allow for an estimation of total number of 
cases, considering that the number of deaths at certain moment should be about 1 % of total cases 18.5 days 
before. This is valid for estimating cases of countries at stage II, since in stage I the deaths would be mostly 
                                                          
9 Madden LV. Quantification of disease progression. Protection Ecology 1980; 2: 159-176. 
10 Zhou et al., 2020. Clinical course and risk factors for mortality of adult 
inpatients with COVID-19 in Wuhan, China: a retrospective 




due to the incidence at the country from which they were imported. We establish a threshold of 50 reported 
cases before starting this estimation.  
Reported deaths are passed through a moving average filter of 5 points in order to smooth tendencies. Then, 
the corresponding number of cases is found assuming the 1 % lethality. Finally, these cases are distributed 
between 18 and 19 days before each one.  
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